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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Defendant, Barbara Ann Ebbert, asserts that the decisions of both the Court of Appeals and the trial court were
correctly decided, and that neither decision presents any issues
warranting the attention of this Court*

Therefore, defendant

will respond to plaintiff's questions presented, rather than formulating her own questions for review.
UTAH COURT OF APPEAL'S OPINION
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in Ebbert v.
Ebbert, Case No. 860229-CA dated November 3, 1987 appears as
addendum 1 annexed to plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
("Petition").
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Defendant acknowledges that this Court has jurisdiction
over plaintiff's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The controlling statutory and other provisions are set
forth in addendum 1 annexed hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of a divorce decree rendered by the
Honorable Phillip R. Fishier, former judge of the Third Judicial
District Court.
Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on June 10,
1985.

(Record, hereinafter "R." 2-11).
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Defendant answered and

counterclaimed and trial was held on March 27, 1986.

(R. 12-17)

The trial court ordered custody of children to the defendant in
accordance with the plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's
answer and counterclaim.

(R. 328-345).

The defendant was ordered

to pay child support and nominal alimony.

(R. 330). The marital

property was divided and the plaintiff was given specific visitation rights.

(R. 329-342).

Plaintiff moved for a new trial on May 27, 1986 on the
issues of child support, child custody and property division.
(R. 276-77).

The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for a new

trial after hearing on July 1, 1986.

(R. 284, 364-384).

There-

after, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals.

(R. 289-90).
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's

findings and conclusions concerning custody, child support and
marital property division, but reversed and remanded the decision
with regard to visitation rights.

Defendant does not appeal the

Court of Appeal's decision on visitation.

On appeal the plain-

tiff claimed that the trial court was biased, but the Court of
Appeals held that the plaintiff had waived review of this issue
by failing to present evidence at trial concerning bias and by
failing to object to the trial court1s alleged expressions of bias.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties were married in June of 1976.
the parents of two daughters ages 7 and 5.
the plaintiff filed for a divorce.
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They are

On June 11, 1985

(R. 2). In his complaint

plaintiff pleaded that custody of the children be awarded to the
defendant and that he be awarded extensive visitation rights.
(R. 2-11).

Defendant answered and counterclaimed also requesting

custody of the children with reasonable visitation to the plaintiff.

(R. 12-17).

In September, 1985 defendant informed the

plaintiff that she was planning to move to Colorado.

(R. 578).

On November 8, 1985 the case was tentatively settled and
the parties presented to the Court a proposed stipulated settlement under which the defendant would be awarded custody of the
children.

(R. 315-326).

The Court accepted the stipulation and

heard evidence on grounds, jurisdiction, and the defendant's
parental fitness, but the parties were thereafter unable to agree
upon form and substance of the findings and decree.

(R. 165-68,

205, 312). Both parties drafted numerous versions of stipulated
settlements and decrees and each draft thereof, including plaintiff's drafts, placed the children in the custody of the defendant.
(R. 101,116; 141-43, 154). The trial court therefore set aside
the stipulated settlement and trial was held on March 27, 1986.
On the day of trial the court met with counsel in chambers (not recorded) and at the commencement of trial stated
without objection that the issues of jurisdiction, grounds and
custody had been previously ruled upon.

(R. 406). During the

trial plaintiff attempted to amend his pleadings and seek custody
of the children.

(R. 620). The trial court denied the motion to

amend citing concerns over the plaintiff's advanced notice of the
issue, his failure to move to amend before trial, and the delay
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that amendment would cause.

(R. 621). Later during the trial,

the plaintiff testified that the defendant had physically abused
the children and that he should therefore have custody.
624).

(R.

The trial court then offered to suspend the proceedings an

order and independent custody evaluation.

(R. 625). The plain-

tiff, after consulting with counsel, declined the court's offer
and instead retracted his statements related to custody issues.
(R. 625).
In its final decree the court granted a divorce, awarded
custody of the two children to the defendant, ordered the plaintiff to pay $325 per child per month in child support based on
plaintiff's after-tax income of at least $24,000 per year,
awarded the defendant nominal alimony for two years, established
a visitation schedule, and divided the marital assets and debts.
(R. 329; 587; 332-42; 241-54; 256-57).

The court filed its fin-

dings, conclusions, judgement and decree on May 16, 1986.
Plaintiff thereafter moved for a new trial seeking joint child
custody which was denied (R. 277), and then appealed to the Utah
Court of Appeals.
ARGUMENT:

SEASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I.

PLAINTIFFfS ALLEGATION THAT HE LOST CUSTODY OF HIS CHILDREN
THROUGH PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES IS WITHOUT SUBSTANCE,
AND FAILS TO PRESENT AN ISSUE MERITING REVIEW BY THIS COURT
Plaintiff's claims that he lost custody of his children
without a hearing, based upon an unexecuted stipulation and
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because the trial court improperly refused to allow him to amend
his complaint were adequately considered by the Court of Appeals
and unanimously rejected.
this Court.

They do not merit further review by

Shorn of all rethoric and in light of the record,

plaintiff's claim of procedural impropriety reduces itself to one
essential allegation:

a father in a divorce action is entitled

to have the appellate court's review the grant of child custody
to the mother notwithstanding that the father affirmatively
prayed for such a result in his complaint.
The simple answer to plaintiff's claim of procedural
error is that the parties are bound by admissions in their
pleadings and statements made at trial.

Here, the plaintiff

received what he asked for in his complaint:
the custody of their mother.

both children in

No procedural impropriety occurred

at trial or before the Court of Appeals.
The plaintiff argues that the trial court should have
permitted him to amend his complaint and seek custody of the
children pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
During trial the plaintiff moved to amend his pleadings to ask
for custody of the children claiming that the defendant's planned
move to Colorado altered his position on custody.

The trial

court denied the motion because the plaintiff had notice months
before trial of the defendant's plans to move to Colorado.

The

Court of Appeals amply addressed that issue and correctly applied
Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 (Utah 1984), which explicitly holds that where a party has notice in advance of trial of
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an issue that may be litigated, it is not an abuse of discretion
for the trial court to deny a motion to amend the pleadings.

The

facts below clearly came within Stratford, and this Court does
not need to re-examine the firmly established rule last articulated in 1984.
Here, however, the plaintiff did more than simply fail
to move to amend his pleadings within a reasonable time before
trial.

While testifying, plaintiff claimed that the defendant

was an unfit mother, in contrast to his complaint.

The trial

court immediately inquired of the plaintiff concerning his testimony and offered to suspend the proceedings and order a custody
evaluation.

The plaintiff, after consulting in private with

counsel, expressly declined the trial court's offer to make
custody an issue.
Plaintiff's citations of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972),
(Petition p. 10) are wholly inapposite to the facts below.
Plaintiff cites the cases implying his children were taken from
him without an adequate hearing.

In the case at bar, the father

pleaded that the mother should have custody of both children and
then expressly declined the court's invitation to inject custody
as an issue at trial.

Stanley v. Illinois held that an Illinois

statute violated equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
where an unwed father was denied a hearing on his parental fitness before his putative children were taken from him after the
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death of their mother.

The case concerns presumptions of paren-

tal fitness of unwed fathers and has nothing to do with knowing
and intentional waiver of custodial rights made in open court as
here.

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld held that sex-based distinctions

in social security benefits violated the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Fifth Amendment and has no relevance to
the facts at issue here.
Plaintiff contends that the Court of Appeals based its
decision on a stipulation that was never executed by the parties,
and relies upon Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987), as
authority that unsigned stipulations may not serve to bind parties to the settlement of a law suit.

Plaintiff grossly distorts

the opinion of the Court of Appeals which clearly and correctly
acknowledges that the stipulated settlements between the parties
were never executed and that the trial court never entered
judgment based on the stipulations.

The Court of Appeals opinion

states:
The [trial] court accepted the stipulated
settlement and heard evidence on grounds and
jurisdiction. The parties were thereafter
unable to agree upon the form and substance of
the findings, conclusions, judgment, and
decree. Consequently, the trial court set
aside the stipulation and set the matter for
trial on March 27, 1986.
(Petition, Addendum 1, p. 1).
The Court further states:
Both by pleading and stipulation, the parties
agreed custody should be awarded to defendant.
Although the parties were unable to agree on
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proposed findings, conclusions, judgments, and
decrees, each draft thereof would have awarded
custody to defendant.
Id. at 3.
Plaintiff necessarily misstates the Court of Appeals
holding because he realizes an accurate reading of the decision
raises no appealable issues of any sort.

The Court of Appeals

never held that an unsigned stipulation served to bind the plaintiff.

It held that the plaintiff's complaint, his failure to

amend his pleading before trial and his own testimony acted as a
waiver of trial of the custody issue.

The Court of Appeals1 men-

tion of the unsigned stipulations drafted by plaintiff's counsel
which all placed the children in the custody of their mother
relates to the evidence supporting the plaintiff's consistent
position that the defendant was a proper custodial parent.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION HOLDING THAT
A FATHER CANNOT EVADE HIS CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
BY IMPUTING THE WEALTH OF THE MOTHER'S PARENTS
TO THE MOTHER AND THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DIVIDING THE MARITAL PROPERTY
DOES NOT RAISE AN ISSUE WARRANTING
FURTHER REVIEW BY THIS COURT
Plaintiff's claim that the Utah Court of Appeal's decision improperly limits the income to be considered in determining
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child support and his claims that parental wealth can be attributed to the defendant in determining support are wholly without
merit.

Despite his self-serving denials, plaintiff's theory is

that because the defendant's parents occasionally provided her
with gifts those gifts should be treated as part of the defendant's income—thereby reducing or eliminating plaintiff's support obligation.

(Petition pp. 15-18).

Plaintiff attempts to argue that Jones v. Jones, 700
P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), and Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah
1980), stand for the proposition that a father's duty of support
should be reduced if the mother's parents are wealthy.

Neither

case even hints at such a principle, and the Court of Appeals
properly rejected plaintiff's ridiculous theory.

This Court has

squarely held that the appellant bears the burden of proving that
the trial court abused its discretion in setting the amount of
child support.

McCrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah

1979); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359,1360 (Utah 1974), and
that well recognized principle does not need to be re-enunciated
by this Court.

Certainly no departure from existing precedent

occurs when an intermediate appellate court affirms a trial
court's finding that a father earning more than $2,000 net per
month can afford to pay child support of $325 per month per child
for his two daughters.

(Petition, Addendum 1, p. 5). The trial

court's finding was well grounded in fact and law and no abuse of
discretion occurred.
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Plaintiff also asserts that the Court of Appeals ignored
his allegations of error by the trial court in dividing the marital property.

Plaintiff frames the issue for review as whether

it is "an abuse of discretion to award 97% of the marital property to one party....1'

(Petition p. 17). Plaintiff disingen-

uously knocks over the straw man he has erected.

Similar

arguments were made before the Court of Appeals and plaintiff's
arguments here are well-plowed ground.

The facts below showed

that the trial court's division of marital assets was roughly
equivalent and not approaching the figures represented by the
plaintiff.

(R. 412, 555-57, 244-46).

Plaintiff cannot show that

the values assigned to the marital property by the trial court
were a clear abuse of discretion as required under precedents of
this Court.

See King v. King, 717 P.2d 715, 715-716 (Utah 1986);

Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6,8 (Utah 1982), and the Court of
Appeals so held.

(Petition Addendum 1, p. 6)

Plaintiff's spurious

claims that defendant received 97 percent of the marital assets
are the product of indecipherable arithmetic that do not deserve
the attention of this Court.
III.
THE APPLICATION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MEIER V. CHRISTENSEN, AND PILCHER V.
STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
IS CORRECT AND DOES NOT DESERVE FURTHER REVIEW
Plaintiff argues that the Court of Appeals improperly
failed to consider the issue of judicial bias even though the
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plaintiff failed to object to trial to the courtfs alleged biased
conduct, and failed to move under U.R.C.P. 63(b) to disqualify
the judge.

(Petition p. 18-19)

Plaintiffs desperate allegation

of bias was rejected by the Court of Appeals because the plaintiff failed to preserve appellate review of the issue by objection or presentation of evidence.

This Court has repeatedly held

that matters not raised at trial will not be considered on
appeal.

Pilcher v. State Department of Social Services, 663 P.2d

450, 453 (Utah 1983); see also Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P.2d 430, 433
(1970).

Here, the defendant and his trial attorney filed affida-

vits with their brief to the Court of Appeals claiming bias by
the trial court.

(Brief of Appellant No. 860229 CA, Addenda 1,

p. 2). Meier v. Christensen, 389 P.2d 734 (1964), cited by the
Court of Appeals, clearly applies to this situation where the
plaintiff-appellant failed to object to the trial court's alleged
expressions of bias and thereby waived the issue for appeal.
(Petition, Addendum 1, p. 6)

Certainly, this Court does not need

to reaffirm the principle that failing to object at trial waives
appellate review of an issue.

Few other principles of law are

more firmly established.
Finally, plaintiff's claim that a "mountain of research11
(Petition p. 19) has been compiled regarding gender bias in the
Utah courts is irrelevant.

Plaintiff failed to raise gender bias

at trial and that issue was never subject to adversarial testing
that would make the issue proper for review on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
DATED this /T7A- day of January, 1988.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
WATKISS & CAMPBELL

JAMES P. COWLEY
WILLIAM H. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant
Barbara Ann Ebbert
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed
by the law firm of WATKISS & CAMPBELL, 310 South Main Street,
Suite 1200, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that pursuant to Rule 47
of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, four copies of the
attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT BARBARA ANN EBBERT IN OPPOSITION
were caused to be personally served upon:
LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS
LAW OFFICE OF LOWELL V. SUMMERHAYS
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant
4609 South State Street
Sandy, Utah 84091
KENN M. HANSON
Attorney of record for
Plaintiff and Appellant at trial
5085 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
this

/ ffiCday of January, 1988.

ADDENDUM

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings.
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless-the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any tune, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth^ur attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
(d) Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upon
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall
so order, specifying the time therefor.
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Rule 63. Disability or disqualification of a judge.
(a) Disability. If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge
before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be
performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly
sitting in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform
those duties; but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those
duties because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may
in his discretion grant a new trial.
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil
or criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the judge
before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or
prejudice, either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite
party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in
another judge to hear and determine the matter.
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known. If the judge against
whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to
another judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction,
which judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit. If the
judge against whom the affidavit is directed does not question the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds
that it is legally sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the case or
determine the matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any case to file
more than one affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are
made in good faith.

